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Development of Athletes' Conceptions
of Sport Officials' Authority
David W. Rainey, Nicholas R. Santilli, and Kevin Fallon
John Carroll University
This study examined baseball players' conceptions of umpires' authority.
Eighty male players, ages 6-22 years, completed an abbreviated Inventory
of Piaget's Developmental Tasks (Furth, 1970), which was used to measure
cognitive development. They then heard recorded scenarios describing con-
flicts with an umpire and a parent. Players indicated if they would argue with
the authorities, why they obey the authorities (obedience), and why the
authorities get to make decisions (legitimacy). Obedience and legitimacy
responses were categorized into Damon's (1977) three levels. Measures of
arguing, obedience, and legitimacy were analyzed for four age levels and
three levels of cognitive development. Older and more cognitively developed
players were more likely to argue with authorities. Conceptions of obedience
and legitimacy were positively associated with age, though they were not
related to scores of cognitive development. The positive relationship between
age and authority conceptions and the absence of a relationship between
cognitive development and authority conceptions are both consistent with
Damon's position.
Key words: umpires, authority, cognitive development, parent/child authority,
perceptions of authority and age, baseball
This study examined the development of athletes' conceptions of authority
in two social domains: organized sport (baseball) and the family. Piaget (1932/
1965) first studied children's perceptions of authority and game rules in his
investigations of the origins of moral judgment. More recent work has sought to
clarify Piaget's original ideas about authority figures. Damon (1977) outlined the
developmental changes in children's perceptions of authority figures, focusing
on parents. He suggested that children's conceptions of legitimacy of authority
and obedience to authority progress through three general developmental levels,
each with two sublevels. Damon's three primary levels (Damon 1977, 1983) are
outlined below:
• Level 0: Legitimacy of authority is based on the self's emotional relation-
ship with the authority, a need to identify with the authority, or the self's
The authors are with the Psychology Department, John Carroll University, Univer-
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respect for the authority's physical attributes (e.g., sex and size). Obedience
to authority is based on the self's desire to submit to the authority's
commands in order to have wishes fulfilled.
• Level 1: Legitimacy of authority is based on the perceived social and
physical power of the authority or a special talent or ability the authority
figure possesses. Obedience to the authority is based on the self's respect
for the authority figure's ability to either enforce commands based on
superior strength or social skill or the authority's talent to achieve results
that the self cannot.
• Level 2: Legitimacy of authority is based on the self's recognition that the
authority has prior training or experience that makes the authority a more
competent leader or that the authority possesses specific attributes that
apply to the given context. Obedience to the authority results in the self's
recognition that the authority's power is situationally determined, tempo-
rary, and mutually agreed upon by the self and the authority figure.
For example, when a Level 0 child is asked why she or he obeys, the child
may respond, "Because she's my mommy." At Level 1 the same question may
be answered, "Because he will ground me if I don't." At Level 2 the response
might be, "Because they've been through all this before and know what they are
doing, and it's best to listen to them."
In research using both cross-sectional and longitudinal samples of 4-
through 10-year-oId children, Damon (1983) found these levels of authority
perceptions to be sequential and directional. Over a 2-year period, no children
regressed in their conceptions of authority. Instead, most children moved upward
one to two sublevels of development.
Piaget (1932/1965) asserted that the development of authority conceptions
depends partly on cognitive development and partly on common social interac-
tions, most notably with parents and peers. In contrast, Damon was not committed
to the notion that cognitive development plays a central role in authority develop-
ment. Instead, Damon (1981) suggested that cognitive development and authority
development follow parallel yet independent paths. He indicated that although
cognitive and authority development may be generally similar, authority develop-
ment may not be controlled by cognitive developmental transitions. In other
words, reasoning about the social world (such as authority figures) and reasoning
about the physical world (general cognitive development as studied by Piaget)
are distinct domains of functioning. Although there may be some superficial
similarities between the two domains, namely sequential and directional pattems
of developmental change, the two domains remain essentially separate due to the
particular objects of knowledge, either the physical or social world.
Others, most notably Kohlberg (1976) and Furth (1980), agree with Piaget's
original position. For these scholars, cognitive development provides the frame-
work necessary for the construction of new knowledge. The particular knowledge
being acquired, either of the social world or the physical world, matters not, for
the individual's cognitive operations serve a general organizing function and are
not limited to a particular type of experience. Thus, this matter regarding the
relationship between cognitive and social development, such as authority develop-
ment, has not yet been settled.
For a number of years, sport psychologists have examined the relationship
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between sport participation and moral development. Studies by Bredemeier and
her colleagues (Bredemeier & Shields, 1984a, 1984b, 1986; Bredemeier, Weiss,
Shields, & Cooper, 1986) have identified significant relationships between sport
participation, moral reasoning, and aggression. For example, Bredemeier et al.
(1986) examined boys and girls in fourth to seventh grades and found that "boys'
participation and interest in high contact sports and girls' participation in medium
contact sports . . . were positively correlated with less mature moral reasoning
and greater tendencies to aggress" (p. 304). Similarly, research has indicated that
nonathletes in high school and college reason at higher moral levels than basket-
ball players in the same age group (Bredemeier & Shields, 1984a, 1984b, 1986).
In addition to these findings, the growing interest in sport and child develop-
ment has led to proposals about appropriate guidelines for studying children in
sport. Weiss and Bredemeier (1983) fittingly indicated that sport psychology
research involving children must be firmly grounded in the appropriate develop-
mental psychology literature. The use of Piaget's and Damon's models to generate
the hypotheses of the current study is consistent with that proposition. However,
this study goes beyond the proposals of Weiss and Bredemeier in two ways.
First, the developmental parameters of this study extend beyond childhood into
adolescence and early adulthood. Although the work of Damon (1977, 1981,
1983) appears to be limited to childhood, his standard for scoring children's
authority conceptions is based on the most advanced level of reasoning demon-
strated by the subject. Damon indicates quite clearly that any subject's responses
are often spread across several adjacent levels of reasoning. Consequently, it is
reasonable to assume that although levels of authority conceptions begin to
differentiate during childhood, these conceptions continue to develop at later
ages. Indeed, later investigations (Turiel, 1978) examined authority conceptions
into early adulthood. Further, the purpose of the current study was not so much
to replicate Damon's work as to extend his model to the world of sport authorities.
In this context, the focus was on the development of authority conceptions
throughout a wide range of amateur baseball. Thus, the participants ranged in age
from the youngest players available (age 6) through the college level.
Weiss and Bredemeier (1983) also proposed that investigators should sam-
ple children according to age-related criteria, a proposal that some authorities
would moderate. Although age ranges frequently accompany descriptions of
developmental stages, they are offered primarily as convenient guidelines, not as
rigid strictures. There is no guarantee that an individual of a given age functions
at a particular developmental stage (Furth, 1981; Piaget, 1971). A more reliable
method of determining developmental level is to assess it directly. Thus, in the
current study there was an effort to sample across broad age categories represent-
ing concrete operations, early formal operations, and consolidated formal opera-
tions. However, at the same time, cognitive development was measured directly
in an attempt to more precisely relate authority conceptions to cognitive develop-
ment.
Based on this background, the present study addressed two questions: Do
conceptions of sports officials' authority show the same type of age-related
progression that Damon reported for parental authority? and What is the relation-
ship between cognitive development and authority conceptions? In considering
the first question, we assumed that the parent/child authority relationship serves
as the prototype for other authority/subordinate relationships. The process of
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examining both parent/child and umpire/player relationships in this study allows
a between-domain comparison of these two authority relationships. Certainly
there are recognizable differences between the parent/child and umpire/player
relationships, the most obvious being the contrast between family and sport
contexts. However, Damon (1980) suggested that perceptions of authority are
transcontextual. That is, knowledge of authority is not entirely situation specific
but relies instead on some universal properties applicable across relationship
contexts. Therefore, it was hypothesized that changes in athletes' perceptions of
sports officials' authority would show the same developmental progression that
Damon reported for parents.
Because Damon's (1977) model suggests that conceptions of authority
evolve toward a view of authority as situational and fallible, it was also hypothe-
sized that older players, players with higher cognitive development, and players
with more sophisticated authority conceptions would be more likely than younger
players to report that they would argue with officials.
In considering the second question, we must recognize that there is still
disagreement regarding the influence of general cognitive development on social
conceptualizing, such as authority conceptions. We addressed this issue by di-
rectly measuring the cognitive development of the participants to determine if
any relationship existed between their cognitive development and their authority
conceptions. The study was considered exploratory in this regard, and no specific
hypothesis was stated.
Method
Participants
Participants were 80 male baseball players who volunteered and were paid
$5. There were 20 participants in each of four age categories: 6-9 years {M =
8.30, SD = .57), 10-13 years (M = 11.25, SO = 1.21), 14-17 years (M = 15.20,
SD = .77), and 18-22 years (M = 19.75, SD = 1.45). Participants in the three
younger age groups were members of 17 teams from a Tris Speaker Baseball
League located in two adjacent middle- to upper-middle-class communities. Those
in the oldest age category were all members of an NCAA Division III baseball
team from a university located in one of those communities.
Materials
Measure of Cognitive Development (IPDT-A). An abbreviated form of
Furth's (1970) Inventory of Piaget's Developmental Tasks (IPDT) was used to
assess participants' levels of cognitive development. The IPDT was developed to
provide a measure of both concrete and formal tasks while requiring little in the
way of language and reading skills. Patterson and Milakofsky (1980) assessed
the reliability and validity of the IPDT using a group of 542 subjects, ranging
from third graders to adult college students and including people who were
developmentally disabled. These authors reported test-retest coefficients for third
graders (.75) to college students (.95), with seven of eight coefficients significant
at p<.Ol. (Though the current study included participants younger than those
studied by Patterson and Milakofsky, the average age of participants in the
youngest group in the present study was 8 years, or about third grade.) Split-half
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reliability coefficients ranged from .63 for sixth graders to .84 for ninth graders.
Construct validity was demonstrated in a number of ways. Consistent with Piaget's
theory (1970), there were significant increases in total IPDT scores from third to
ninth grade but no difference between ninth graders (14-15 years) and college
students (18-19 years). Similarly, the mean number of tasks mastered (which was
computed using a 75% criterion level) was greatest among older subjects: none
by third graders, 5 of 18 by sixth graders, 12 by ninth graders, and 15 by college
students. Finally, there were significant correlations between IPDT scores and
standardized intelligence and achievement tests.
Five of the original 18 subtests of the IPDT, totaling 20 items, made up the
IPDT-A. The choice of the five subtests was based on pilot testing with baseball
players from the same groups used in the study. This testing suggested that all
subjects in the sample would master the five easiest subtests of the IPDT; these
subtests were discarded. Using data reported by Patterson and Milakofsky (1980),
which identified subtests mastered by different age groups, we chose five subtests
that would provide a distribution of scores among the subjects to be sampled. For
example, Patterson and Milakofsky reported that 70% of third graders got three
out of four items correct on the Levels subtest, so this was selected as an easy
subtest. Conversely, only 46% of college students got three out of four items
correct in the Classes subtest, so this was chosen as the most difficult subtest.
The subtests chosen were Levels, Conservation of Weight, Probability, Shadows,
and Classes.
Conflict Scenarios. Two tape-recorded scenarios, with wording slightly
altered to accommodate younger subjects, were used to present conflict situations
to the participants. These were patterned very closely after those used by Damon
(1977) in his studies of children's perceptions of parents' authority. The umpire
scenario was presented first and stated the following (statements in parentheses
were used with younger subjects):
Your baseball team is playing for the championship. (Because it is for the
championship, the umpires are very experienced adults.) If your team wins
this game, you are the champions. Your team is behind by one run. There
are two outs, but there is a runner on first, anci you are on second base. There
are three balls and two strikes on the batter, and you will be running with the
pitch. If the batter gets a hit, you are sure you can score the tying run and
keep your team in the game. If you score the tying run you will be a hero.
If you make an out, your teammates will be very disappointed with you, and
you will feel bad for not tying the game. The batter hits the ball into the
outfield but not far from the fielder. You run hard and slide into home plate.
You are sure you are safe and have tied the game for your team. The umpire
calls you out. The game is over. Your team loses. You are very upset and
turn to look at the umpire.
The parent scenario stated the following:
Imagine the following situation at home. Let's say that your parents have a
rule that you can't go out (out to play) on the weekend until your room is
cleaned up. Early one Saturday, your best friend comes over and asks if you
would like to go to Cedar Point (a regional amusement park) with him (with
him and his parents); he is (they are) leaving immediately. You want to go.
Development and Officials' Authority / 397
but your room is a mess. You tell your parents that you do not have time to
clean your room now, but that you will clean it when you get back. Your
parents tell you that you must stay home and clean your room. Your friend
leaves. You miss the trip to Cedar Point. When he is gone you are very upset.
You tum to your parents.
Structured Interviews. Structured interviews were used to question partici-
pants about their reactions to the conflict scenarios. These, too, were patterned
after interviews used by Damon (1977), but questions were reworded to be
appropriate to the content of the scenarios. There were six questions and additional
probes, following the same pattem for the umpire and parent scenarios. The
following three questions were relevant to the current study:
1. What would you do? (If a participant said he would argue or complain, this
was followed up by probes asking how he would argue, how long he would
argue, and if he would argue even if he knew it would do no good.)
2. Even when players (kids) disagree with umpires (parents), they usually
obey them. Why do you obey? Why do you obey even when you think they
are wrong? (This question was used to assess the dimension of authority
that Damon, 1977, labeled obedience.)
3. Why does the umpire (parent) get to make the calls (make the rules)? What
gives this person the right? (This question was used to assess the dimension
of authority that Damon, 1977, labeled legitimacy.)
Procedures
Letters announcing and describing this study were mailed to 503 members
of a Tris Speaker Baseball League and 40 members of an NCAA Division III
baseball team. Players (or their parents, in the case of younger athletes) called
the investigators to volunteer. About 18% of those who were sent letters volun-
teered. There were excess volunteers in each group, and participants were accepted
on a first-come, first-served basis. Each volunteer was given an individual appoint-
ment time, and the experimenter met with each participant at a university psychol-
ogy department laboratory. Each session lasted approximately 30 min. Parents
signed permission forms for participants in the three younger age groups, and all
participants were read a statement describing the study and informing them of
their right to withdraw at any point without question or loss of the $5.
The experimenter first administered the IPDT-A, using the standard instruc-
tions from the IPDT. Participants then listened to the recorded umpire conflict
scenario and responded to the structured interview questions. Finally, participants
listened to the parent conflict scenario and responded to the questions. All re-
sponses were recorded on a microcassette recorder. After this the experimenter
explained the purpose of the study, answered any questions, and thanked the
participants. Three months later, a letter was sent to each participant describing
the results and inviting further questions.
Participants' recorded responses were transcribed, and the senior author
categorized responses related to obedience and legitimacy into the six levels
identified by Damon (1977), blind to participants' ages and developmental
levels. Because there were so many empty cells in these tables, responses were
recoded so that they were categorized into Damon's three primary levels of
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development. To assess the reliability of these judgments, we trained an indepen-
dent judge, who categorized the responses, blind to the purpose of the study and
to the ages and cognitive development levels of the participants, into the three
levels.
Results
Reliability in the Use of Damon's Three-Level Model
We computed kappa statistics (K) (Siegel & Castellan, 1988) and Pearson
/• to assess the reliability of the categorization of participants' responses to
interview questions using Damon's (1977) three-level model. Landis and Koch
(1977) reported that kappa values above .60 indicate that two raters have good
to excellent agreement. Interrater reliabilities for conceptions of obedience for
umpires (K = .72, r = .78), legitimacy for umpires (K = .68, /- = .77), obedience
for parents (K = .76, r = .70), and legitimacy for parents (K = .86, /- = .90) were
all significant, p<.01.
Adequacy of the IPDT-A
To evaluate the utility of the IPDT-A, the authors assessed its reliability
and construct validity. To assess reliability, we computed Chronbach's alpha for
the 20 items among the 80 participants. Alpha was found to be .76, a figure that
is in the middle of the range of split-half reliabilities reported by Patterson and
Milakofsky (1980) for the IPDT and above Nunnally's (1978) acceptable level
of .70. Reliabilities among the five 4-item subtests were as follows: Levels = .58,
Conservation of Weight = .80, Probability = .45, Shadows = .65, and Classes =
.49. Alphas were also computed for the entire scale for each of the four age
groups. They were as follows: 6- to 9-year-olds = .57, 10- to 13-year-olds = .79,
14- to 18-year-olds = .76, and 19- to 22-year-olds = .63. A number of these
figures are below traditionally acceptable levels.
To assess the construct validity of the abbreviated measure, we analyzed
the pattem of mean scores across the four age groups. Following Piaget's (1970)
formulation of cognitive development, scores on this measure should increase
until about age 12. At that age, basic cognitive development is complete (most
individuals having attained the stage of formal operations), and mean scores on
the IPDT would not be expected to increase significantly. This is the pattem
reported by Patterson and Milakofsky (1980) in their evaluation of the IPDT.
Descriptive statistics for scores of the four age groups on the IPDT-A are presented
in Table 1. A one-way ANOVA of the means revealed significant differences
among the four groups, F(3,76) = 8.59, p<.OOI. Follow-up with Scheffe's proce-
dure indicated that the three older groups all scored significantly higher (p<.05)
than the youngest group, but there were no significant differences among the
three older groups. This is consistent with what Piaget would have predicted.
Mean scores increased in participants up to the 10- to 13-year-old group (mean
age 11.3 years) and then ceased to increase significantly.
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics for iPDT-A Scores of Four Age Groups
6-9 years 10-13 years 14-17 years 18-22 years
M 11.4" 14.30 15.50 15.90
SD 2.85 3.74 3.19 2.51
'Differs significantly from the other three means, p < .05.
Despite the limitations of the intemal consistency figures for the IPDT-A,
the authors decided to pursue the analysis, and the IPDT-A scores were used to
categorize the levels of cognitive development of the participants.
Relationship of Age to Conceptions of Authority
We calculated gammas (y) to assess the association between age group
categories and scores for Damon's three stages, which had been assigned by the
raters to responses to interview questions about umpire and parent authority.
Gamma is a nonparametric measure of association appropriate for ordered categor-
ical data (Siegel & Castellan, 1988). Scores for obedience (Why do you obey
umpires/parents?) and legitimacy (Why do umpires/parents have the power to
make decisions?) were analyzed separately. This analysis revealed positive associ-
ations between age and conceptions of obedience (y = .62, p<.01) and legitimacy
(y= .70,p<.001) for umpires, and between age and conceptions of obedience (y =
.59,p<.01) and legitimacy (y= .63, p<.Ol) for parents. Thus, older players tended
to have more mature conceptions of authority for both parents and umpires.
Relationship of IPDT-A to Conceptions of Authority
We conducted similar analyses to assess the relationship between IPDT-A
categories and conceptions of obedience and legitimacy. To conduct these analy-
ses, we divided scores on the IPDT-A into three ordered categories: Low (scores
from 7-11), Medium (12-16), and High (17-20). We conducted an analysis of
variance to determine if this categorization created levels of cognitive develop-
ment that were significantly different. A one-way ANOVA indicated that the
differences among the mean IPDT-A scores were significant, f (2,77) = 286.22,
p<.001. Follow-up analysis with Tukey's HSD procedure revealed that those in
the Medium category had a mean score significantly higher than those in the Low
category, and those in the High category had a mean score significantly higher
than those in the Medium category. Thus, this categorization created three groups
with reliably different levels of cognitive development.
In the subsequent analysis of the relationships between authority concep-
tions and levels of cognitive development, we evaluated the gamma values at an
alpha level of .01 to avoid an inflated probability of Type I errors. With this
400 / Rainey. Santilli, and Fallon
Standard, none of the associations between categories of cognitive development
and conceptions of obedience and legitimacy for parents or for umpires were
significant.
Relationships Between Authority Conceptions
for Parents and Umpires
We analyzed the authority conception scores for parents and umpires for
the 80 participants to assess their association. This was done separately for
obedience and legitimacy scores. This analysis revealed a significant positive
relationship between obedience conceptions for parents and umpires (y - .73,
/7<.OO1), but the relationship between legitimacy scores was nonsignificant.
Arguing, Age, IPDT-A Scores, and Conceptions of Authority
We analyzed players' reports regarding whether they would argue with
authorities about disputed decisions to determine if these reports were related to
age, cognitive development as measured by the IPDT-A, and level of conception
of authority. This analysis indicated significant relationships between age and
reports of disputing umpires (/= .50,p<.001) and parents (/= .39,p<.001). Older
players were more likely to report they would dispute parents and umpires. There
were also significant relationships between cognitive development as measured
by IPDT-A and reports of disputing umpires (/• = .50, p<.001) and parents (/• =
.28,/7<.Ol). Players with higher levels of cognitive development were more likely
to report that they would dispute authorities.
We conducted logistic regressions (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1989) to determine
if cognitive development was significantly related to whether players would argue
with authorities when the influence of age had been removed. In this analysis,
the dependent variable was the dichotomy of whether or not participants had
reported they would argue with parents and umpires. Age was entered as the first
predictor variable, and IPDT-A score was entered last. These analyses indicated
that IPDT-A scores were significantly related to arguing with umpires when the
effects of age had been removed (r = .26, /?<.O1), but IPDT-A scores were not
significantly related to arguing with parents with the effects of age removed.
Finally, the relationships between authority conception scores and responses
about arguing with parents and umpires were calculated. These analyses indicated
significant relationships between reports of arguing with umpires and conceptions
of obedience (y = .65, p<.001) and legitimacy (y = .61, p<.0\) for umpires.
The more mature the conceptions of obedience and legitimacy, the more likely
participants were to report they would argue with umpires. There was also a
significant relationship between conceptions of legitimacy for parents and arguing
with parents (y = .62, p<.01). The more mature the conception of legitimacy of
authority of parents, the more likely participants would argue with parents.
However, the relationship between conceptions of obedience for parents and
arguing with parents was not significant.
Discussion
Agreement With Damon's Model
There was support for the hypothesis that the development of players'
conceptions of sport officials' authority shows the same type of increasing sophis-
tication as individuals grow older that Damon (1977) found in his research about
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parental authority. The descriptions of officials' authority were progressively
more sophisticated as players got older, and this pattem was apparent for both
obedience and legitimacy.
When asked why they obey umpires, the youngest players were most likely
to appeal to their emotional relationships with the umpire (e.g., "If I don't he'll
be angry and not like me."). Among older players the responses tended to focus
on social power (e.g., "He's in charge," or "He's the boss."). Among the oldest
players responses shifted to comments about objectivity and the mutual benefit
of having someone play such a role (e.g., "He's more neutral, so you don't
argue all the time."). Thus, the understanding of obedience tended to be less
personalized and to focus more on social function among progressively older
players.
A similar progression was apparent in the players' responses to the question
about why the umpire has the power to make judgments or decisions. Among the
youngest players the responses tended to focus on purely physical characteristics
(e.g., "He's older," or "He's bigger than me."). Olderplayers tended to respond
in terms of the special attributes or talents of the umpire (e.g., "He's good at it,"
or "He knows what an umpire should do."). The oldest players responded more
in terms of special training or experience and mutually agreed upon roles (e.g.,
"He's gone to umpire school, so both teams agree to go by his decisions.").
Again the responses changed focus from the person of the umpire to the umpire's
acquired social status.
Even though the current results did parallel Damon's stages (1977), the
authority conceptions of the athletes within this sample were not identical for
parents and umpires. Although there was a significant relationship between obedi-
ence conceptions for parents and umpires, there was no relationship between
legitimacy conceptions for parents and umpires. Thus, the players' reasons for
obeying parents and umpires tended to be similar, whereas their explanations of
the power of parents and umpires were unrelated. This inconsistency in legitimacy
conceptions may occur because parents regularly inform children about parental
legitimacy, whereas exposure to information about the legitimacy of sport officials
is much less consistent.
Arguing With Authorities
There was also support for the hypothesis that players' reports that they
would argue with parents and umpires would be related to age, cognitive develop-
ment, and conceptions of obedience and legitimacy. Older players, and those with
higher scores in cognitive development, were more likely to report that they
would argue with authorities. Age was the most important correlate of arguing
with parents. Older players were more likely to argue with parents, but when the
effect of age was removed, their arguing was unrelated to cognitive sophistication.
In contrast, arguing with umpires was significantly related to cognitive develop-
ment when the influence of age was removed. Thus, in this sample, arguing with
umpires was more related to maturity of understanding than was arguing with
parents! Although the tendency to argue with an authority is probably determined
by a number of factors (personality variables, situational variables, possible
consequences, etc.), one interpretation of these results is that the tendency to
argue increases as the perceived inviolability of authority diminishes with increas-
ing age, cognitive sophistication, or both.
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This interpretation is reinforced by the finding that those with more ad-
vanced conceptions of obedience and legitimacy were also more likely to report
that they would argue with umpires and, in the case of legitimacy, were more
likely to argue with parents. Players with more advanced conceptions of authority
view the umpire's authority as situational. The authority is part of the temporary
role, not a quality of the person. Players with more advanced conceptions of
authority also recognize that the game, not the umpire's authority, is the most
important feature of the competitive situation. Thus, the more cognitively sophisti-
cated players may believe it is acceptable to dispute umpires because they appro-
priately view them as functionaries. In contrast, younger, less sophisticated
players, who view obedience to the authority figures as the most important aspect
of any situation, believe it is unacceptable to dispute the umpire. It is also possible
that more cognitively advanced players believe they understand the rules and
interpretations of the rules as well as the umpire, whereas the younger, less
sophisticated players entertain no such notions.
If these interpretations are accurate, conflicts between players and umpires
are, to some extent, an unavoidable consequence of the cognitive development
of the players. If so, disputes with sports officials, within certain boundaries,
could even be viewed as developmentally appropriate behavior. The arena of
sport has long been depicted as a social laboratory where children leam social
skills. One implication of this study is that educators can use sport settings to
teach children how to handle conflict with authorities appropriately. Although
such an effort would require significant changes in the expectations of many
umpires and in the conflict behavior of all adults associated with youth sport,
there could be long-term benefits for both officials and players.
The Role of Cognitive Development
The finding that authority conceptions are not related to level of cognitive
development can be explained in two ways. First, the absence of significant
fmdings may be a function of the questionable reliability of the IPDT-A. Reliabili-
ties for four of the five subtests and for two of the four age groups were below
acceptable standards. Assessment of the relationships between cognitive develop-
ment scores and authority conceptions revealed that two of the four gammas were
almost significant (p<.05), and it is possible that a more reliable measure would
identify significant associations. A second explanation is that the absence of
associations between cognitive development and authority conceptions represents
a confirmation of Damon's (1977) position. Damon has argued that development
of understanding for the physical world, the type of development measured by
the IPDT-A, is independent of the development of social understanding, such as
authority conceptions. Thus, the lack of a relationship between IPDT-A scores
and authority conceptions is consistent with his position.
Conclusions
The results of this study suggest that the general course of development of
authority conceptions for sport officials is similar, though not identical, to the
course of development of parental authority conceptions that Damon (1977)
described. There was also support for the hypothesis that age, cognitive develop-
ment, and sophistication of authority conceptions are related to the tendency of
players to dispute umpires' and parents' decisions.
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Though there was support for a number of the hypotheses of this study,
readers should keep in mind the limitations of the method and setting. First, the
intemal consistency of the IPDT-A, although adequate across the entire sample,
was limited in two of the age groups and for most of the subscales. A more
reliable measure of general cognitive development would be very useful in future
studies. Second, all the athletes were male, and it is possible that there are gender
differences in the development of the sport authority conceptions. Further, because
the participants were necessarily volunteers, it is likely that the sample is not
representative of all athletes. Similarly, the participants were all baseball players,
and it is not at all certain that athletes from different sports develop sport authority
conceptions in the same manner. Finally, athletes from three of the four age
groups competed in the same league. The quality of officiating and the nature of
athlete/official relationships can vary dramatically from league to league, and this
type of variability can easily influence the development of authority conceptions.
Thus, although this study provides some tentative answers to questions about the
development of sport authority conceptions, researchers need to examine the
influence of these and other variables for a more complete understanding.
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